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Abstract. It is a hard problem to achieve anonymity for real-time services in the Internet (e.g.
Web access). All existing concepts fail when we assume a very strong attacker model (i.e. an
attacker is able to observe all communication links). We also show that these attacks are real-
world attacks. This paper outlines alternative models which mostly render these attacks useless.
Our present work tries to increase the efficiency of these measures.
1ÊÊ The perfect system
1.1ÊÊ Attacks
The perfect anonymous communication system has to prevent the following attacks:
1. Message coding attack: If messages do not change their coding during transmission they
can be linked or traced.
2. Timing attack: An opponent can observe the duration of a specific communication by
linking its possible endpoints and waiting for a correlation between the creation and/or
release event at each possible endpoint.
3. Message volume attack: The amount of transmitted data (i.e. the message length) can be
observed. Thus, a global observer is able to associate a communication relation to a cer-
tain client and server.
4. Flooding attack: Each message can only be anonymous in a group of sent messages. All
senders of those messages form the anonymity group. Under normal circumstances, each
sender should send one message per time interval. However, some of the existing con-
cepts enable an attacker to flood the system in order to separate a certain message.
5. Intersection attack: Because of the on-line/off-line periods of the users an attacker may
trace them by observation over a long period.
6. Collusion attack: A corrupt coalition of users or parts of the system may be able to trace
certain users.
Perfect means that there cannot occur a situation where an opponent gets valuable information
concerning any communication relation or communication request from and to a certain user.
However, no system can protect from an opponent with unlimited power. Therefore we assume
that the opponent may not be able to break into cryptographic functions. Though, we have to con-
sider that parts of the anonymous communication system may act as opponents (insider attacks).
1.2ÊÊ Functions of a perfect system
Prevention of collusion attack. A perfect anonymous communication system will be a distrib-
uted system. No central system can protect from a corrupt insider since he has all information
concerning the sender and recipient of a communication relation. Thus, he can observe a commu-
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k-1 used nodes ("used" concerning a certain communication relation) are opponents, the protec-
tion still works. The first nearly perfect system described in the literature is a network consisting
of so-called Mixes [Chaum 1981]. A Mix is a node in a distributed system of k such Mix nodes.
A message is transmitted from the sender to the recipient via the k Mix nodes. The opponent may
observe all k+1 communication links or k-1 nodes may be corrupt. The operators of the k Mixes
should be distinct.
Prevention of message coding attack. To prevent message coding attacks, the sender en-
crypts the message with k nested layers of public-key encryption. Each Mix removes one layer.
Link-to-link encryption between Mixes is not sufficient in order to prevent insider attacks.
Prevention of message volume attack. To prevent message volume attacks, all incoming
messages of a Mix have the same length. All outgoing messages of a Mix have the same length.
To prevent replay attacks, each message will be processed by a Mix only once.
Prevention of timing attack. It is obvious that a certain message can only be hidden in a
group of messages. The communication relation cannot be protected if only one message is
transmitted in a certain period of time. Therefore a Mix waits until a defined number n of mes-
sages have arrived from n users. Afterwards, all messages will be put out together, but in a differ-
ent order.
The delay of transmission depends on the behavior of other users, i.e. in situations with low
traffic the delay gets high. Since the Chaumian system was designed to protect e-mail, there was
no reason to force down the delay. However, if the aim is protecting real-time services (e.g.
World Wide Web, chat service etc.), a few modifications and additions to Chaumian Mixes have
to be built in.
Dummy messages have to be transmitted in order to reduce delay. Thus, the amount of trans-
mitted messages is likely high enough to process messages immediately. However, it is not suffi-
cient to send dummy messages only between Mixes. Fig. 1 shows an extreme case where dummy
traffic between Mixes is completely insufficient because only one message is an ordinary mes-
sage. Thus, observing in front of the first Mix and behind the last Mix uncovers the communica-
tion relation.
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Fig. 1: Dummy traffic between Mixes only
Dummy messages have to be sent end-to-end in order to decrease delay as well as maintain
the security level.
Prevention of flooding attack. Checking the identity of n users ensures that a single user is
not able to flood a Mix with n-1 own messages in order to trace the remaining single message. In
a practical system designed for the Internet it is very difficult to prevent flooding attacks since the
system has to check the identities. However, in the existing Internet secure identity management
is not available. Thus, an opponent can fake different identities in order to simulate different us-
ers. It seems to be strange that a secure system has to check the identities of users while they
want to remain anonymous. However, we can reduce this demand. In a practical system it has to
be ensured that a message is authenticated. Authentication means to check whether a user is per-
3mitted to use the service with a specified amount of traffic. It does not mean the identification of
users. By means of blinded signatures requests (and messages) can be authenticated without
identification of their originator.
Prevention of intersection attack. A perfect system has to prevent intersection attacks: Be-
cause of the on-line/off-line periods of the users or a special distinguishable behavior an attacker
may trace users by observation over a long period. Ordinary Internet users have a limited number
of communication relations and show a very balanced behavior. That means, they have got at
most a few hundred e-mail addresses they use, and the number of periodically visited Web sites
changes very rarely. More technically spoken, if a client configures his browser to request a cer-
tain Web page each time he opens a new browser window, he puts his unobservability at risk.
The observer has only to remember the identities of all active users at the time of the request.
Later on, when the page is requested again (and again), the observer intersects the previous set of
active users with the currently active users. This kind of attack does not definitely uncover a cli-
ent. However, it dramatically reduces the potential size of the anonymity group. Whenever the
user sends individual information (i.e. Cookies, ID numbers, pseudonyms or data of any kind
used more than once) that no one else uses, the opponent will be able to uncover all belonging
communication relations with a high certainty.
2ÊÊ Comparison of existing systems
2.1ÊÊ Why do existing systems fail
With the knowledge of the attacks described above, it is easy to find out the limitations of exist-
ing systems. The following systems are well known and some of them can really be used to pro-
tect the communication, i.e. some systems are public available: (A comprehensive list of other
systems is enclosed at the end of the paper.)
•  www.anonymizer.com: Anonymizer is a form-based proxy service. For the following
analysis and classification of systems we use Anonymizer as a representative of all sys-
tems belonging to that class. Other similar systems are listed at the end of the paper.
•  www.research.att.com/projects/crowds: Crowds was proposed by AT&T Research. It is
based on secret key cryptography and the concept of a distributed system in order to pre-
vent collusion attacks.
• www.onion-router.net: Onion Routing is a system proposed and maintained by US Naval
Research Center. It is based on ideas comparable to the Chaumian Mix concept and pro-
vides an anonymous IP-based transport system.
• www.freedom.net: Freedom is a commercial system. It is also based on ideas comparable
to Chaumian Mixes and is usable for real-time communication services on the Internet as
well. Additionally, Freedom provides a pseudonymous communication infrastructure
where users can assume virtual identities, so-called "nyms".
We compare these systems with
1. the classical Mixes introduced in [Chaum 1981] and designed for untraceable e-mail con-
versation, and
2. our solution for real-time communication (Web Mixes). For more information on our
system, see section 4.
See Table 1 for the comparison and the lacks concerning the attacks described above. Whenever
a system protects from an attack, the cell in Table 1 is set up in italic type-face.
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Table 1: Comparison of systems regarding the general attacks described above
* Remark: If an attack is described as irrelevant, the system already fails due to other attacks that
can be launched much easier.
Most practical systems attach great importance to the prevention of message coding attacks
and collusion attacks. However, they do not prevent timing attacks, message volume attacks,
flooding attacks and intersection attacks. The reason is that these systems were not designed in
terms of prevention of these attacks under a very powerful opponent who observes all communi-
cation links.
52.2ÊÊ Qualitative aspects
Table 1 shows a verbal comparison of systems. Now, we try to refine the comparison more
qualitatively. Existing concepts for anonymous communication can be classified my means of the
items listed in Table 2. Additionally, performance aspects and costs, such as delay and bandwidth
efficiency should be taken into consideration.
Good Better
Systems considering outsider attacks Systems considering outsider and insider attacks
Systems not considering traffic analysis Systems considering traffic analysis
Systems with a single point of failure (regarding
privacy)
Distributed systems resistant to collusion attacks
Systems protecting from passive attacks (e.g. ob-
serving)
Systems protecting from both passive and active attacks (e.g.
flooding)
Table 2: Evaluation aspects of systems
Fig. 2 shows a comparison of the systems regarding collusion and strength of observation. In
Fig. 3 we compare the systems concerning their delay or bandwidth efficiency. The tradeoff be-
tween security (privacy) and efficiency is obvious.
1 of k k-1of k0
number of colluding nodes
(insider attacks by means of traffic analysis)
1
2
k+1
n
u
m
be
r o
f o
bs
er
ve
d 
lin
ks
 
(ou
tsi
de
r a
tta
ck
s, 
tra
ffic
 a
na
lys
is)
Crowds
Onion
Routing
Anonymizer
Freedom
Chaum
Mixesbest
better
be
tte
r
Fig. 2: Comparison regarding protection from collusion and observation
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3ÊÊ Anonymous services or anonymous networks?
There are two different general approaches to provide anonymity in the Internet. They are:
1. Based on a non-anonymous transport system (layer 1-4 in the OSI reference model), try to
implement anonymity in higher layers as far as it is desired.
2. Implement anonymity in the lower OSI layers and build different services upon it with
anonymity to a certain extent (e.g. real anonymity, pseudonymity, optional self-
identification, authentication, mandatory identification if necessary).
We believe that the second solution, i.e. a purely anonymous network as basis for many kinds of
communication, is more suitable because of the following reasons:
• Providers need not know anything about the communication they are routing except for
accounting information. It may even be in the interest of the provider not to be able to
know anything about the communication to avoid legal liability issues.
• An implementation of anonymity in higher layers based on a non-anonymous transport
system is technically much harder (if at all possible) than the other way round.
• With an anonymous transport system, the design of services in higher layers still offers all
degrees of freedom.
In particular, the parties involved in an anonymous communication may decide to reveal their
identity to the other party or third parties later on in the communication process, i.e. with an
anonymous communication network non-anonymous or even authenticated communication is
still economical. The opposite may not be true.
Another advantage of a universal solution for anonymity in networks consists in the impossi-
bility to distinguish between the use of different services while observing the transport system.
4ÊÊ Our System
4.1ÊÊ Goals
To evaluate the feasibility and costs of anonymity in the Internet and to explore several deploy-
ment opportunities we are developing an anonymity system for drug counseling (see
7http://www.xtc.mesh.de/.) on the Internet. Our goal is to provide a secure and anonymous techni-
cal infrastructure. The special concerns of drug counseling are analyzed by a research group at
University Lbeck, Germany. This service will be based on an architecture suitable to provide a
purely anonymous network (see section 3) and is therefore usable for any kind of anonymous
communication on the Internet.
During the last three years we developed several Mix-based and proxy-based anonymity
services (for Web surfing and similar real-time services). Our academical interest is to show that
anonymity can be efficiently realized. The special aim is to develop a theoretical background for
the efficient implementation of anonymity services in the Internet. We are building an anony-
mous transport system based on a specific IP format. The goal is to enable asynchronous (like
SMTP) as well as nearly synchronous modes of communication (like HTTP) and handle various
kinds of packets.
At the moment three implementations or prototypes are available. The first one is a simple
form-based proxy service (like Anonymizer.com) that filters dangerous contents (scripts, embed-
ded objects etc.) from the webpage (see http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/anon/a/). The second one is
a Mix-based service using cryptographic functions from Secure Socket Layer (SSL) on both, the
client (user) and the server (Mix) side. The third one and newest is a Mix-based implementation
that is Java-based on the client side (for platform independent development) while the server side
is implemented in C language to achieve high computation speed in cryptographic operations.
The Web site of our project is http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/anon/.
Basically, we use
• a modified Mix concept with
• an adaptive chop-and-slice algorithm (see section 4.2),
• sending of dummy messages whenever an active client has nothing to send,
• a ticket-based authentication system that makes flooding attacks impossible or very ex-
pensive and
• a feedback system that gives the user information on his current level of protection.
4.2ÊÊ Description of functions
Our basic concepts are very similar to other systems based on the idea of Mixes. A Mix scram-
bles the order of data streams and changes their coding using cryptography to make traffic corre-
lation attacks hard. Constant dummy traffic means that all senders send messages at all times to
create the same anonymity groups. If necessary, random data is generated which cannot be dis-
tinguished from genuine encrypted traffic. Dummy traffic has to be sent between the endpoints of
a communication relation. Dummy traffic only between Mixes is not sufficient to prevent traffic
analysis (see section 1.2).
From the Mix model (cf. [Chaum 1981]) we use:
• layered public-key encryption,
• prevention of replay,
• constant message length for incoming and outgoing messages within a certain time period
("slice" see explanation below), and
• changing the order of outgoing messages.
For real-time communication we additionally developed the following concepts both to make
traffic analysis harder and to increase the efficiency.
81. Adaptive chop-and-slice algorithm: Large messages (and streaming data) are chopped
into short pieces of a specific constant length, called "slice". Each "slice" is transmitted through
an anonymous Mix channel. In addition, active users without an active communication request
send dummy messages. Thus, nobody knows about the starting time and duration of a communi-
cation because all active users start and end their communications at the same time. Otherwise, an
observer could determine where and when the anonymous channel starts and ends and find out
who is communicating with whom. Dependent on the traffic situation, we modify the throughput
and duration of the anonymous channel. The concept of chopping long communications into
slices was first introduced in [Pfitzmann et al. 1991]. We use a modified variant with an adaptive
duration or throughput.
2. Dummy messages are sent from the the starting point (i.e. client) into the Mix network to
make traffic analysis harder (see timing attacks in section 1.2).
3. Ticket-based authentication system for the prevention of flooding attacks: A very dif-
ficult problem arises with an active attacker who floods the anonymity service with messages in
order to uncover a certain message. This flooding attack is already described in [Chaum 1981]. It
had been made harder by the pool concept introduced by Lance Cottrell in Mixmaster (see
http://www.obscura.com/~loki/remailer/remailer-essay.html). Although the pool concept was not
intended to prevent that attack, it is useful to make the attack much harder for an outsider since it
reduces the probability of success. However, insiders (i.e. Mixes) are still able to attack other
Mixes with flooded messages. We believe that we found a new concept to suppress flooding of
messages both from outsiders and insiders. At first, we limit either the available bandwidth or the
number of similar used time slices for each user. Secondly, each user has to show that he is al-
lowed to use the system at the respective time "slice" by providing a ticket only valid for the
certain "slice". To protect the identity of the user the ticket is a blinded signature issued by the
anonymous communication system. More precisely, each Mix issues a limited number of tickets
for each "slice" and user. This design of the ticket is useful in order to add the functionality of a
prepaid payment system for the anonymity system, too. However, this function has not been im-
plemented yet.
4. Measurement of anonymity level: We believe that it is important for the user to be aware
of his level of privacy. It makes a system more reliable and trustworthy for the user. Therefore we
analyze the problem how to measure the anonymity. However, since the anonymity level de-
pends on the number of active users within the system we need a mechanism or a heuristic that
informs the user about his protection level when he requests contents from the Internet. At this
time, we are working on the development of reliable and trustworthy mechanisms to visualize the
anonymity level.
5. Intersection attacks: As described in section 1.2 an opponent should not be able to do in-
tersection attacks. However, at this time, it is an open question how to prevent intersection at-
tacks. Dummy traffic makes intersection attacks somewhat harder but does not prevent it. We can
only give advice to users how they can hinder an observer: The success of an attack can be re-
duced by trying to avoid sending and receiving linkable events such as sending Cookies, re-
questing personal Web pages, using pseudonyms in chat services more than once and so on.
5ÊÊ Concluding remarks
Using Internet services nowadays means leaving digital traces. Anonymity and unobservability
on the Internet is a sheer illusion. On the other hand, most people agree that there is a substantial
9need for anonymous communication as a fundamental building block of the information society.
The availability of anonymous communication is considered a constitutional right in many coun-
tries, for example for use in voting or counseling.
The project is a joint venture between the Dresden University of Technology, the Privacy
Commissioner Schleswig-Holstein and some providers who are interested in offering anonymity
for their users. This constellation of expertise guarantees a high level of technical and jurisdic-
tional knowledge in combination with a hands-on approach, maximizing security and perform-
ance.
Compared to Table 1, obviously, the hardest attacks are attacks by traffic analysis, i.e. timing
analysis, message volume attacks and intersection attacks. Of course these attacks are hard to
launch for an outsider. However, the operator of a system has the possibility to do traffic analysis
with a dramatically decreased effort. This is the most important reason why traffic analysis
should not give useful information to an attacker. Otherwise, it makes no sense for the client to
use Mix-like services (such as Onion Routing, Freedom etc.) if the operator of the service is still
able to observe. Simple proxy services with an encrypted link between the client and the proxy
would be sufficient. However, the protection of proxies is very limited since proxies do not pro-
tect from their operators.
Consequently, the architecture of an anonymity system should properly consider traffic
analysis. It is one of the major challenges for the security community to find new and efficient
concepts that render traffic analysis useless to improve the users' privacy.
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Appendix
AÊÊ Related links to our work
• http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~hannes/rp.html
• http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~hannes/ws.html
• http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/anon/
BÊÊ Known systems and related projects
Remailers, systems for server anonymity, and systems for pseudonymous e-mail communication
are not listed.
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B.1ÊÊ Client anonymity: Simple proxy services
• www.Anonymizer.com Ñ a form-based proxy service
• Aixs.Net/aixs Ñ another form-based proxy service
• Anonymouse.home.pages.de Ñ yet another form-based proxy service by Taker
• www.Rewebber.com Ñ form-based, by Demuth / Rieke (former janus.fernuni-hagen.de)
• www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/anon/a Ñ Anon Proxy; our implementation of a form-based
proxy service
• www.ProxyMate.com / LPWA.com former www.bell-labs.com/project/lpwa Lucent Per-
sonalized Web Assistant (LPWA)
B.2ÊÊ Client anonymity: Services considering attacks via traffic analysis
• www.research.att.com/projects/crowds Crowds by AT&T
• www.onion-router.net by US Navy
• www.freedom.net Freedom by Zero-Knowledge Systems
• www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/cebit98 Web Mixes; our prototype implementation
• www.KQMLmix.net
• www.privada.net Privada WebIncognito
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